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FOREWORD: ANCIENT RIGHTS AND WRONGS
JAMES LINDGREN*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Like a moderator introducing a panel of speakers, I view my role
in this Foreword as briefly making a few points and then getting out of
the way to allow the scholars to speak for themselves. This is an easy
task, since the group of papers on ancient wrongs are, to my mind, the
most interesting of the four groups of papers in the Symposium. Further, the authors themselves have done a particularly good job of placing their papers in the context of the traditions in which they writeand thus need little help from me. All of these papers were presented
at a conference at Berkeley in March 1995, funded by the Robbins
Collection at Berkeley and the Chicago-Kent College of Law.
These papers, all involving issues of wrongdoing, manage to raise
a wide range of issues about ancient law generally:
(1) How did ancient laws arise?
(2) What were the functions and purposes of ancient codes and law
collections?
(3) What can ancient law systems tell us about the structure and
customs of ancient societies?
(4) How did the state arise and how is law related to the origins of
the state?
(5) What are ancient notions of justice?
(6) Compared with modern societies, how individualist or collectivist were ancient societies?
(7) How different are ancient societies from each other?
(8) Are human beings really more or less the same throughout time
or are they fundamentally different?
Obviously, we can't answer these questions in just six papers, but if
you read them carefully, I think that you will be surprised how much
light is shed on these issues. This set of papers, at least as well as any
others in this Symposium, reflects the strengths that scholars from
very different intellectual traditions can bring to the same sorts of
texts and problems.
* Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law (through June 1996); Professor of Law,
Northwestern University (after June 1996); Lecturer, University of Chicago Law School (Spring
1996); Ph.D. student, Sociology, University of Chicago. I would like to thank Laurent Mayali
and the Robbins Collection at Berkeley for their generous funding of the conference at
Berkeley.
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THE PAPERS ON RIGHTS AND WRONGS

ROTH. In Mesopotamian Legal Traditions and the Laws of Hammurabi,1 Martha Roth tackles two complementary, but related issues:
the place of the Laws of Hammurabi in the Mesopotamian legal system and the face-slapping provisions of those laws. Roth analyzes the
prologue and epilogue of the Laws of Hammurabi to show what Hammurabi's purpose in promulgating the Laws might have been: his
political and military message to his audience. The prologue states
that the purpose was to "provide just ways and appropriate behavior
for the people of the land," 2 as well as to prevent the mighty from
wronging the weak "and to provide just ways for the wronged."'3 In
the prologue, Hammurabi boasts of his accomplishments and conquests.4 Roth suggests that the Laws' primary purpose was "to reinforce the superior position of Hammurabi among his contemporaries,
'5
both nominal equals and vassals.
She then examines the influence of the Laws in ancient times, the
Laws being frequently copied and displayed in public for over a thousand years. They served as a model for later law collections and as
texts in the scribal tradition-an influence not unlike that of the T'ang
Code in ancient China.6 Roth also explores the political and psychological meaning of the monument containing the Laws, in both modem and ancient times.
Roth last engages in a brilliant and wholly persuasive analysis of
the text of the face-striking provisions in the Laws of Hammurabi.
She points out that the penalties for face-striking in Hammurabi are
more serious than would seem to be reasonable for the amount of
physical injury done. By a careful analysis of the wording of the provisions, Roth concludes that the high penalties reflected, not physical
harm, but an insult to honor. This nicely supports her larger claim
about the goals of the Laws of Hammurabiin setting and maintaining
social power relationships.

1. Martha T. Roth, Mesopotamian Legal Traditions and the Laws of Hammurabi,71 Cn.KENT L. REV. 13 (1995).
2. Id. at 17 (quoting the prologue to the Laws of Hammurabi).
3. Id. at 17.

4. Id. at 17-18.
5. Id. at 19.
6. See Wallace Johnson, Status and Liability for Punishmentin The T'ang Code, 71 CHi.KENT L. REV. 217, 217 (1995).
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WHITMAN. In At the Origins of Law and the State: Supervision of
Violence, Mutilation of Bodies, or Setting of Prices?,7 James Whitman
takes on the sociological, philosophical, and historical tradition that
views the origins of the state as arising from the need to monopolize
violence-what legal historians call the self-help model. Whitman argues that this story is only partly true, a tale that is often at odds with
the historical evidence in early codes and law collections. He sees the
setting of just prices and the mutilation of bodies as problems for the
monopolization of violence thesis.
Whitman shows that the regulation of mutilation in early codes
went far beyond simple private vengeance or the talionic rule (an eye
for an eye). Turning to price-setting, Whitman more fundamentally
argues:
On their face, the archaic codes belong, not to a modern world characterized by the policing of the streets, but to a pre-modem world
characterized by the deeply felt need to set just prices. What early
authorities arguably clamped down upon was, not violence, but the
market; the great issue was not safety in the streets, but the evermysterious psycho-social dynamic8 of money-a dynamic easily
linked to magico-religious beliefs.
These words resonated with me, since my own paper in this Symposium uses the explicit prices set for wrongs to different social classes in
ancient codes to determine the ascribed social value of those classes. 9
At the conference at Berkeley, some of the area experts thought
that it was strange that Whitman would take Hegel, von Jhering,
Weber, and other promulgators of the self-help thesis so seriously.
After all, the thesis was originally developed before the Mesopotamian law codes were found. Who would get their history from theorists with little knowledge of the facts? Having just suffered through
several courses on sociological theory as part of my graduate training
at Chicago, I can vouch for the continued primacy of the self-help
thesis. Among experts in historical sociology in American universities, the view that Whitman questions is usually taught as dogma. 10
Whitman's elegant paper here is an important corrective to the halftruth of the self-help thesis.
7. James Q. Whitman, At the Origins of Law and the State: Supervision of Violence, Mutilation of Bodies, or Setting of Prices?, 71 Crn.-KE rr L. REv. 41 (1995).

8. Id. at 81.
9. James Lindgren, Measuring the Value of Slaves and Free Persons in Ancient Law, 71
CH.-KENT L. REv. 149 (1995).

10. Even worse, romantic Marxian notions about extreme collectivism and a lack of private
property in ancient societies are occasionally still offered to students without correction.
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LEVMORE. In Rethinking Group Responsibility and Strategic
Threats in Biblical Texts and Modern Law," Saul Levmore examines
two related problems--collective responsibility and strategic threats
of extra punishment ("overextraction"). First, Levmore questions the
standard wisdom that group responsibility in ancient law has given
way to individual responsibility in modem law. He attacks this idea
on both sides. He points out that, in the Bible, individual responsibility predominates when there is a known wrongdoer. Further, he argues that modem law shares responsibility for intentional or negligent
wrongs through insurance, taxes, and higher prices at stores suffering
from shoplifting.
Next Levmore turns to strategic threats in the Bible and one section of the Laws of Hammurabi. He examines the stories of Solomon,
Joshua, Jonah, and Adam and Eve, looking for hints of overextraction. Levmore posits that a sensible strategy for uncovering wrongdoers is to threaten to punish a group that contains the wrongdoer so
severely that even the wrongdoer has an incentive to confess, thus
sparing himself an even worse fate. Since such a strategy would appear to be efficient, Levmore wonders why it isn't more frequently
used. In the story of Jonah particularly, he suggests that it may have
been. As Levmore explains,
Jonah boarded a ship in an attempt to escape his prophetic mission
and God's reach. God then sends a storm so severe that the sailors
initiate a lottery to see who is to blame for their imminent death.
The lot points to Jonah, who confesses to them, and then insists that
they overcome
their reluctance to save themselves by throwing him
12
overboard.
Levmore argues that Jonah's confession may have been rational in
that he confessed either to spare his fellow passengers or to increase
his chances of survival through divine intervention by confession and
self-sacrifice.
After his fascinating examination of strategic threats, Levmore
concludes by suggesting that collective responsibility may have a modest presence in widely ranging legal systems. This supports some of
his path-breaking earlier work arguing that there is a general uniform13
ity in legal rules across ancient, modern, and local societies.
11. Saul Levmore, Rethinking Group Responsibility and Strategic Threats in Biblical Texts
and Modern Law, 71 Cmn.-KEWr L. REv. 85 (1995).
12. Id. at 115.
13. See Saul Levmore, Variety and Uniformity in the Treatment of the Good-Faith Purchaser,
16 J. LEGAL STUD. 43 (1987); Saul Levmore, Rethinking Comparative Law: Variety and Uniformity in Ancient and Modern Tort Law, 61 TuL L. REv. 235 (1986).
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Levmore's wonderful merger of Biblical stories, game theory, and economics shows how much insight modern Law and Economics schol14
ars can bring to our understanding of the Bible.
CARMICHAEL. In Incest in the Bible,15 Calum Carmichael does
his usual superb job of Biblical exegesis. His analysis of the incest
rules in Leviticus 18 is a model of how to do close analysis of ambiguous biblical texts and to place that analysis in a larger context. Carmichael argues that the series of incest rules in Leviticus 18 can be
understood only in the context of the history of patriarchal sexual relationships set out elsewhere in the Bible. Issues of incest arose with
Abraham, Jacob, Judah, Moses, and David-or their immediate
16
families.
Carmichael argues that the purpose of the rules was not to reflect
existing society, but rather to comment on the sexual activities of the
Biblical ancestors and to guide sexual practices of the day. He points
out that the condemnations are not heaped on the ancestors, but
rather on outsiders-the Egyptians and the Canaanites. 17 This sort of
boundary maintenance tends to create solidarity within the group.
Thus, even if the lawgiver had the potential incestuous relations of the
patriarchal ancestors in mind, he chose to ascribe incest to the influence of other groups. He does this by pointing out that some of these
activities took place when the Israelites were living in a different culture (Egypt), blaming the host cultures, rather than the Israelites for
the disapproved behavior. Carmichael's analysis of the social meaning of incest rules is persuasive.
As to the reasons for the incest rules, Carmichael finds that a
possible increase in defective offspring does not seem to be the cause
of these rules, since Carmichael finds no evidence that the ancients
were aware of any biological effects of inbreeding. Instead, he shows
that, even in the Bible, incest leads to fighting within the family and
family breakdown.
Carmichael's view is roughly consistent with the conclusions of
some social scientists "that all restrictions on incest and consanguineous marriage [including modem ones] exist because of social advantages to such restrictions, and that avoidance of biological effects of
inbreeding is a secondary benefit that plays no major role in maintain14. For another merger of game theory and the Bible, see STEVEN J. BRAMS, BIBLICAL
GAMES: A STRATEGIC ANALYSIS OF STORIES IN THE OLD TESTAMENT (1980).

15. Calum Carmichael, Incest in the Bible, 71 Cm.-KErr L. REV. 123 (1995).
16. Id. at 125.
17. Id. at 145.
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ing the taboos. ' 18 I am somewhat skeptical of this social view when
the biological explanation is so simple and the taboo is nearly universal in time and place (though its scope varies widely). Further, there is
some evidence that higher primates avoid incest and that mice choose
mates with different genetic tissue types, so the biological may actually drive the social behavior unconsciously.1 9 It is possible to view
the incest taboo as biologically driven even if the ancients were no
more aware of genetic defects from inbreeding than are mice or
monkeys.
LINDGREN. I would love to tell you how interesting this fellow
Lindgren's paper is,20 but since we share the same life, I must decline.
JOHNSON. Although this Symposium covers three continents and
four millennia of ancient law, except for Wallace Johnson's paper, our
coverage of East and South Asia is minimal. 2 ' Johnson discusses the
most influential work in East Asian legal history, the Chinese T'ang
Code of A.D. 653. His concern is a central one: Status and Liabilityfor
Punishment in The T'ang Code. 22 Johnson's fascinating paper intersects with several other papers in the Symposium concerning status
and punishment, particularly those by Roth and myself.
The T'ang Code, which was influential in Japan, Korea, and Vietnam, set out an elaborate series of punishments: (1) beating with a
light stick, (2) beating with a heavy stick, (3) penal servitude (for five
different periods of time), (4) life exile (at three different distances),
and (5) death (by strangulation and decapitation). 23 Each of these
punishments could be redeemed by the payment of stated pounds of
copper.24 In many cases, officials could resign from office instead of
being otherwise punished. 25
Three forms of status could lessen punishment: social status, family status, and status due to age, sex, and physical and mental condition. Johnson notes that group responsibility for punishment was
common. Even Buddhist and Taoist priests and nuns were treated
18. W.F. BODMER & L.L. CAVILLI-SFORZA, GENETICS, EVOLUTION, AND MAN 366 (1976).
19. Id. at 362 ("[M]ammals (especially the higher primates) ... [show] some tendency toward avoiding incest."); Susan C. Alberts & Carole Ober, Genetic Variability in the Major Histocompatibility Complex: A Review of Non-Pathogen-Mediated Selective Mechanisms, 36 Y.B.
PHYSICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 71, 81-84 (1993).
20. Lindgren, supra note 9.
21. My article briefly examines the Laws of Manu from ancient India (among many other
sets of laws). Lindgren, supra note 9, at Tables 14-16.
22. Johnson, supra note 6.
23. Id. at 220-21.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 221.
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much like families, with different punishments according to their place
in the hierarchy. Although officials were sometimes punished less severely than nonofficials, at other times they were punished more severely under the concept of pao, "reciprocity." 26 Greater power
brought greater responsibility.
Vicarious and collective punishment can also be found in interesting patterns:
Similar to the collective punishment of family members, where one
of them had committed rebellion, sedition, or treason, was the collective responsibility of officials in an office for the offenses of any
one of them. Four levels of officials were punished, even though
they 27
had no knowledge of the offense, much less having participated

in

it.

Here Wallace presents some evidence for Levmore's contentions that
the strategic punishment of innocents may sometimes lead to efficient
behavior-in this case to discourage wrongdoing. Yet if those who
revealed others' wrongdoing were punished as well, this kind of collective punishment would not lead to increased detection, since the
innocent officials would have no incentive to turn in the wrongdoer.
III.

CONCLUSION

When I read ancient law codes and collections, I am frequently
struck by two opposing impressions: people are really the same; people are really different. In ancient attitudes toward property ownership, monetary punishment, and especially status and prestige, I see
more similarity with modern law than I would expect to see, given the
differences in knowledge, culture, and technology. On the other hand,
in ancient attitudes toward slavery, women, and mutilation, I tend to
see differences so fundamental that I find it hard to understand how
the ancients could have thought so differently from us. Yet I am reminded that one has to go back only a generation to see similar views
about women in the United States, and two centuries to see analogous
views about mutilation and slavery. Further, some of the ancient attitudes toward women are still common today elsewhere in the world,
and slavery and mutilation have not been completely eradicated from
the Earth.
I hope that the six papers on Ancient Rights and Wrongs validate
the original conception that Laurent Mayali, Geoffrey Miller, and I
had when we put together this Symposium-that ancient area experts
26. Id. at 227.
27. Id. at 228.

12
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and modern scholars could profit by getting together to look at the
same sources from different points of view. If you are curious about
the excitement that these papers might generate for your own work,
read on.

